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1 Introduction
There are several convincing economic models providing theoretical foun-
dations for opportunistic business cycles, i.e. business cycles produced
by oﬃce-seeking policy-makers intending to win elections, with an up-
turn right before elections. Ability to trade-oﬀ short-run benefits for
long-run costs or asymmetric information of politicians and voters can
explain such behavior. Empirical evidences, especially those from devel-
oping countries, tend to support opportunistic cycles hypothesis.
Several reasons suggest the existence of opportunistic business cy-
cles in Ukraine. Ukrainian anecdotal evidences and media argue for a
rapid liquidation of wage arrears, increase in social welfare transfers,
establishment of price controls etc. in pre-election period. A recent
empirical study for Russia (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2003) finds
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strong support for opportunistic cycles theory there. Ukrainian insti-
tutional framework, which is quite similar to Russian, is likely to give
same results. No such studies for Ukraine were conducted so far.
The aim of this empirical research is to test for the presence of op-
portunistic electoral business cycles in Ukraine. National-level data on
economic activity indicators and regional-level data on economic policy
measures (budget data) are used. We also try to evaluate the magnitudes
of cycles, and check whether magnitude decreases with sophistication of
voters.
2 Literature review
There is a number of stylized empirical facts observed that propose the
existence of opportunistic business cycle (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
For instance, inflation increases shortly after elections; budget deficits
tend to be larger during election years; there is also some (not very
strong) evidence that monetary policy is more expansionary before elec-
tions. On the other hand, real variables, such as growth or unemploy-
ment, are not systematically correlated with elections dates.
Political business cycles [PBC] is one of the most studied areas within
the field of Political Economics, being granted separate chapters in core
Political Economics textbooks by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Drazen
(2000a). A separate fundamental book by Alesina et al. (1997) has al-
ready been published.
The literature on PBC is enormous now, and its survey is a task that
deserves a separate paper. Obviously, this job was fulfilled by many
authors, and besides above—mentioned Political Economics textbooks
and Alesina et al. (1997) book, it has also been done in Price (1997),
Gartner (1994), Hibbs (1992), Nordhaus (1989) etc. Empirical tests of
PBC are very much emphasized in Alesina et al. (1997), they are also
reviewed in Drazen (2000a). Excellent brief summary of empirical works
is given in Block and Vaaler (2001).
In this paper we plan to concentrate on opportunistic (on the contrast
to partisan) business cycles exclusively. Opportunistic business cycles
[OC] are created as a result of opportunistic oﬃce—motivated behavior
of politicians. Originally, Nordhaus (1975) claimed that the incumbent
government adopts expansionary policy ahead of the elections, reaping
short—run benefits before, and postponing long—run costs till the time
after the elections.
Although the first wave of PBC researches was started in 1970—s, they
did not digest a rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, and
relied on the irrational backward—looking behavior of voters. Specifically,
they assumed a Phillips curve relation between inflation and output (or
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unemployment), with adaptive expectations of voters. The interest to
PBC reappeared in the late 1980—s. Second wave of PBC papers ac-
cepted rational behavior of voters, incorporating rational expectations
in their framework. The most important papers were those by Rogoﬀ
and Sibert (1988), and Rogoﬀ (1990), which concentrated on rational op-
portunistic cycles based on asymmetric information about government’s
competence.
The PBC literature is mushrooming since the 1990—s, andmany inter-
esting works appeared at this time. We will shortly mention those, which
influence this research most significantly. Drazen (2000b and 2001) con-
structed so called ”active fiscal—passive monetary” model of rational OC,
in which monetary policy of CB accommodates government’s manipula-
tion of fiscal policy. In explicitly dynamic context, Asteriou et al. (2000)
incorporated OC into general equilibrium endogenous growth model. Shi
and Svensson (2001) used a large panel data set to test rational OC.
It is generally recognized that PBC are indeed observed in the data.
For OC, more so in the behavior of policy instruments than in the be-
havior of measures of economic activity. More in fiscal rather than in
monetary policy (which is naturally less politically biased). Also, OC
are more pronounced in developing economies.
An important contribution to the OC literature was made by Treis-
man and Gimpelson (2001). This paper argues that incumbent has a full
menu of instruments to manipulate the economy, and chooses between
alternatives depending on their relative costs and benefits. Naturally, at
diﬀerent elections and at diﬀerent points of time incumbent may choose a
unique set of instruments. Thus, exhaustive tests for OC should consider
the full range of possible manipulations, because focusing on one indi-
cator only may incorrectly reject the OC hypothesis. Such an approach
allows Treisman and Gimpelson to find significantly stronger evidence
for the presence of OC in the Russian data.
Hallerberg and de Souza (2000) studies political business cycles in
Eastern European EU accession countries controlling for exchange rate
regimes and central bank independence. They find that countries with
flexible exchange rate regime and dependent central bank.increase mon-
etary supply, while countries with fixed exchange rate engage in fiscal
expansions during electoral periods.
Now we will touch in more details a recent empirical paper on PBC
in Russia. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) tests for the presence of
opportunistic and partisan political business cycles in Russian regions.
It uses a monthly panel data for 1996-2002 in 86 Russian regions, and
finds strong evidences of opportunistic political cycles.
Total budgetary expenditures, expenditures on education, health-
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care, social disbursements, industrial subsidies, and mass media start
growing about nine months before elections (with a significant jump up),
rise gradually for eight months after that, and then exhibit the largest
increase one month before elections. Total spending and spending on ed-
ucation, culture, and mass media drop sharply right after the elections,
other spending items decline more gradually. Wage arrears (especially
in public sector) decrease throughout the year prior to elections with
an increasing pace and gradually accumulate during the first quarter af-
ter the elections. Revenues rise a month before elections mostly due to
increases in federal transfers and fall sharply during two months after
elections due to decline in transfers and tax revenues. Additional pre-
electoral expenditures are financed partly with budget deficit, partly
with transfers, and partly with surplus accumulated approximately a
year prior to elections when social expenditures and subsidies are be-
low and wage arrears above their natural levels. Incumbent governors
pursue expansionary policy and try not to overburden enterprises with
higher taxation. The cycles in social expenditures, regional wage arrears
(which primarily target poor) as well as media expenditures appear to
have the largest amplitude, they are the most important instruments of
pre-electoral manipulations. An increase in populist spending prior to
elections leads to above average inflationary pressure. Governors, how-
ever, try to confine inflation by administrative price controls during few
months before elections, so prices rise after elections. Wage level and
money income rise significantly before elections; wages fall a quarter
after elections. Industrial output follows a particular cyclical pattern:
it falls half a year before elections, then stabilizes until elections and
falls again after elections. These fluctuations do not result in signifi-
cant changes in regional growth rates. It is the poorest cohort of voters
that is targeted by cyclical policies. Magnitude of opportunistic cycles
decreases with voters’ rationality and awareness.
The last relevant to our work paper is Mau et al. (2001), which
conducted a thorough analysis of the economic factors of electoral be-
havior in Russian regions for 1995-2000 federal elections. It found that
economic indicators have significant impact on voting decisions, and es-
pecially stresses the importance of wage arrears, payables and receiv-
ables. Thus, the authors make a conclusion about rationality of Russian
voters. However, they argue that temporal expansion of budget expen-
ditures does not significantly modify voters’ opinion.
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3 Conceptual framework
3.1 Theoretical background
Formal model of rational opportunistic cycles was developed in Rogoﬀ
(1990). The general idea of Rogoﬀ’s political budget cycles model is
based on asymmetric information: rational voters do not know rivaling
policy-makers’ competence. And more able incumbent distorts govern-
ment’s (fiscal) policy to signal its higher competence. The first best
solution would be to find a less distorting signal. For example, accumu-
lation, analysis and dissemination of information about policy-makers
performance (e.g. through mass-media) will let voters make some in-
ferences about incumbent and opposition politicians’ competence. Also,
legal restrictions on distorting behavior may increase social welfare (they
might decrease welfare as well, if even more distorting policy will be pur-
sued instead, or competence will not be revealed at all). Finally, allowing
for option of calling for an early election will provide an additional op-
portunity for signaling.
If rationality of voters does not hold, then traditional Nordhaus’ op-
portunistic business cycles’ theory applies. Incumbent (irrespective of
his competence) will cheat naive and myopic voters: adopt expansion-
ary policy ahead of the elections, reaping short-run benefits before, and
postponing long-run costs till the time after the elections. For example,
this can be done in a world with Phillips curve inflation-unemployment
trade-oﬀ and adaptive expectations of voters. In this case, education
and informing of voters, and legal restrictions on opportunistic behavior
will be the best solutions.
Depending on institutional arrangement, opportunistic cycles can be
exhibited in some policy instruments (with the possibility of switching
between them with time), but absent in other. Also, they may or may
not finally influence measures of real economic activity.
3.2 Hypotheses
Hence, our hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis A. Governmental policy and behavior of measures of
economic activity exhibit electoral cycle.
Hypothesis B. Magnitude of electoral cycles in governmental policy
and behavior of measures of economic activity decreases with the rise of
voters’ sophistication and available information.
We expect that both hypotheses will find support. Unfortunately,
this would not allow us to disciminate betwen rational and traditional
theories of electoral cycles, because (i) it is not practically possible to
separate proxies for voters’ sophistication from those for information
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Table 1: Ukrainian budget system
BUDGET APPROVED BY SIGNED BY EXECUTED BY
LEVEL (DECISIVE)
State budget Parliament President Cabinet of
Ministers
Regional Regional Head of Regional
(oblast) council regional state state
budget administration administration
symmetry, and (ii) both of them predict similar relationship between
the magnitude of cycles and above-mentioned proxies. However, since
rejection of Hypothesis B also disproves the rational PBC theory, it
would be reasonable in this case to recommend restricting the distorting
opportunistic behavior of policy-makers, because no useful information
about competence is revealed then. On the other hand, acceptance of
Hypothesis B does not reject neither rational nor traditional PBC the-
ories, thereby confirming the existence of problems with voter’s sophsti-
cation and/or information asymmetry. In such a case, policy targeted
at solving these two problems would be desirable.
3.3 Ukrainian political system
There are two layers in Ukrainian budget system: national level (State
budget) and local level (oblast, rayon/city, town/cities’ rayon, and vil-
lage). On the local level, we will deal with 27 oblast (“region” from
now on) level budgets exclusively. Budgets are approved by councils –
Ukrainian parliament “Verkhovna Rada” for State budget, and regional
councils for regional budgets, and signed by President for State budget,
and heads of regional administrations for regional budgets. However,
they are executed by executive power — Cabinet of Ministers for State
budget and regional state administrations for regional budgets, who have
decisive power with respect to short-term fiscal policy decisions. Hence,
executive power (President, Cabinet of Ministers, and regional state ad-
ministrations) has higher influence on fiscal policy than councils do (es-
pecially on short-term decisions). Similar scheme with the dominance of
executive authorities works for the whole system of economic policy in
Ukraine.1
1For example, temporary price restrictions can be set by regional executive au-
thorities.
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At the same time, executive power is dominated by the President of
Ukraine. President defines general principles of governmental policy in
Ukraine. Also, in addition to (formal) rights of making appointments
to/dismissing from executive oﬃces, he/she has strong (albeit informal)
influence on legislative power.
As a result, economic policy in Ukraine to a large extent is defined
by the President. Consequently, political actors are split between pro-
Presidential parties and parties that are alternative to them. This pat-
tern replicates on presidential and parliamentary elections. That is why
from now on, we define incumbent as pro-Presidential parties (so called
“party-in-power”), and opposition as alternative to pro-Presidential par-
ties.2
Ukrainian political system implies elections to the Parliament of
Ukraine every 4 years, Presidential elections every 5 years, and elec-
tions to local councils every 4 years, as well as elections of cities, towns,
and village mayors every 4 years. Presidential elections are organized
according to two-stages relative majority scheme: on the first round,
two candidates with relative majority of collected votes qualify; on the
second, candidate that received more votes wins. One half of the mem-
bers of Parliament (225 persons) and all members of local councils are
elected under a one-stage relative majority system. Second half of the
2Certainly, this distinction is not always unambiguous. However, it is a conven-
tional one, even for transitional countries. For example, Mau et al. (2001) also use
a “bipolar” prospective for Russian experience.
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Table 2: Recent elections in Ukraine
DATE ELECTIONS INCUMBENT
March 1998 Parliamentary and local National-Democratic Party,
councils elections Agrarian Party of Ukraine
October 1999 Presidential election Leonid Kuchma
March 2002 Parliamentary and local “For United Ukraine” Bloc,
councils elections Social-Democratic Party of
Ukraine (united)
members of Parliament is elected under a proportional system with a
4% threshold: parties’ lists that gained more than 4% of votes share 225
seats proportionally to the number of votes collected, and they represent
country as a whole, rather than specific districts.
And the basic logic of elections process in Ukraine is as follows: in-
cumbent cares about its candidate(s) trying to influence elections’ out-
come through its representatives in public authorities (both national and
local, legislative and executive), utilizing the fact that any improvements
are ascribed to the incumbent (“party-in-power”) candidate(s).
The mechanism of Presidential elections is straightforward then. Mat-
ters are more complicated for Parliamentary and local councils elections,
since they involve voting for both parties’ lists and single candidates.
The very existence of voting for parties’ lists (which are the same
in every district) makes incumbent to favor pro-Presidential parties in
every region of Ukraine, including creation of political cycles in regional
budgets (as well as in other policy instruments). For example, in 1998
central government and regional state administrations influenced by the
President were interested in creating cycles in State and regional budgets
to favor NDP and APU parties’ lists.
Voting for single candidates to the Parliament somehow blurs this
eﬀect. The same considerations as above (i.e. securing pro-Presidential
majority in the Parliament) pushed central government and regional
state administrations to create cycles in order to favor single candidates
to the Parliament from pro-Presidential parties. This incentive is likely
to be weaker for the districts represented by an opposition MP (because
he/she might reap all the benefits from voters’ satisfaction). However,
voters’ perception that economic policy is shaped by incumbent rather
than opposition reduces the possibility of attribution of (temporal) eco-
nomic policy improvements (or deteriorations) to opposition MPs even
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in those districts. Still, if magnitude of political cycles decreases in such
districts, then regions with larger number of opposition MPs are ex-
pected to exhibit cycles of lower magnitude. (Political cycles may even
have an opposite shape there.)
Parliament and regional councils could not eﬀectively resist this pres-
sure for creating political cycles, not only because of lack of suﬃcient au-
thority, but also due to the fact that none of the councils had a majority
formed by opposition. Hence, opposition parties and single candidates
were not able to counteract this policy on both national and regional
level in any voting district. Although, diﬀerent degree of capture of re-
gional councils by the “party-in-power” (presence of opposition check)
probably influenced the regional diﬀerences in the magnitude of cycles.
As to (single candidates’) elections to regional councils, again, “party-
in-power” is interested in creating cycles to favor its candidates. And
it is unlikely that opposition in regional councils could resist this policy
or that voters ascribed any positive outcomes to opposition members
of regional councils. Still, even if magnitude of political cycle shrinks
in the districts represented by opposition members of regional councils,
every region as a whole is supposed to demonstrate a political cycle.
Again, caution concerning the degree of “party’s-in-power” capture of
regional councils and corresponding variations in the magnitude of cycles
applies.3
Our interpretation and methodological approach (incumbent vs. op-
position) is very much similar to Mau et al. (2001), which studies elec-
toral behavior in Russia on the basis of 1995-2000 federal elections data
from Russian regions.
4 Empirical tests
4.1 Data description
Consumers price index inflation and real GDP growth are tested for
the presence of electoral cycles in economic outcomes (i.e. indicators
of economic activity). Monthly national-level data on CPI, PPI, and
3Final remarks supporting our claim on the existence of incentives for creating
regional cycles are as follows. It is generally recognized by Ukrainian political sci-
entists that on Parliamentary elections people vote according to their ideological
preferences (“after their heart”) only for parties’ lists, while in single candidate’s
choice they are guided by pragmatic considerations rather than political preferences
(vote “after their brain”) – support the candidate who distributed more financial
“aid” to voters (although this practice is legally banned). Another important back-
ground fact is that elections to local councils attract far less attention of voters than
elections to the Parliament.
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nominal GDP4 from the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine are
used. Real GDP is deflated by PPI, and January 2000 is taken as a base
level.
However, this investigation emphasizes testing for electoral cycles
in economic (particularly, fiscal) policy measures. We investigate the
data of State and regional budgets. Data on budgets execution, rather
than planned budgets, are used because actual flaws of budget incomes
and expenditures diﬀer from planned ones (especially in the short-run).
State and regional budgets execution reports are taken from the Treasury
oﬃce.
Only Parliamentary (March 1998 and March 2002 in the period of
interest), Presidential (October 1999), and regional councils elections
(which were conducted simultaneously with Parliamentary elections, in
March 1998 and March 2002) are considered.5 Thus, we are looking for
opportunistic cycles in 1998:M3, 1999:M10, and 2002:M3.6
4.2 Model specification
For econometric testing we use aggregated national-level monthly data
on GDP growth and CPI inflation during 1996-2002, and monthly panel
data of regional budgets execution in 27 Ukrainian regions during 1998-
2001 period.
The specification suggested for testing Hypothesis A about the pres-
ence of electoral cycle is autoregressive model augmented with elections
variable:
yi,t = α0 + αi + αs +
kX
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
mX
j=−l
γjet+j + δt+ εi,t (1)
where:
yi,t – economic variable (total budget expenditures, social expen-
ditures, share of social expenditures, healthcare expenditures (in levels
and as a share), expenditures on agriculture (in levels and as a share),
expenditures on industry (in levels and as a share), total revenues, tax
4Although monthly GDP series is based on rather limited preliminary statistical
data and Committee’s expert estimates, these are the oﬃcial conventionally used
data.
5It is noteworthy that because of a relatively short time series, seasonal and elec-
toral eﬀects are blended in our sample, and discrimination between them is driven
by several, possibly non-representative observations at hand.
6This aspect dramatically contrasts Russian case, where elections of regional gov-
ernors, which are conducted at diﬀerent time periods independently in each subject
of federation, are investigated (see Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2003).
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revenues (in levels and as a share), expenditures to revenues ratio, GDP
growth etc.),
α0 – constant term,
αi – fixed regional eﬀect,
αs – fixed time eﬀect (seasonal dummy),
βj – coeﬃcients for autoregressive terms,
γj – coeﬃcients reflecting pre-(post-)elections period eﬀect on eco-
nomic variable,
et – dummy variable, which equals 1 at the month of elections, and
0 otherwise,
δ – trend coeﬃcient (for trend-stationary variables),
εi,t – disturbance term.
Obviously, for aggregated national-level series equation 1 reduces to:
yt = α0 + αs +
Pk
j=1 βjyt−j +
Pm
j=−l γjet+j + δt+ εt.
Hypothesis A predicts a U- or refersed U-shaped pattern (depending
on the nature of respective indicator) formed by γj.
Hypothesis B about the determinants for the magnitude of electoral
cycle will be tested in related to previous technique, using:7Pm
j=−l(bγj + bγj,i + bγj,t)et+jPm
j=−l byi,t+j = α0 + αi + βxi,t + εi,t (2)
where:
t = {1998 :M3, 1999 :M10, 2002 :M3},
xi,t – proxy variable for sophistication of voters and easiness of ac-
cess to information (e.g. share of population with higher education,
share of urban population, number of computers per capita, number of
newspapers registered per capita),
β – coeﬃcient capturing the influence of voters’ rationality and in-
formation accessibility,bγj,i – estimated coeﬃcients reflecting regional (preferably random,
rather than fixed) pre-(post-) elections period eﬀect on economic vari-
able,bγj,t–estimated coeﬃcients reflecting time (preferably random, rather
than fixed) pre-(post-) elections period eﬀect on economic variable,byi,t+j – fitted value from ARIMA model of yi,t.
It is easy to see that numerator on the left-hand sife of equation
2 measures the absolute magnitude of electoral cycle, and fitted values
7A more radical approach would be to attribute any divergence from trend to
opportunistic cycles by using instead:
Pm
j=−l(yi,t+j−byi,t+j)Pm
j=−l byi,t+j = α0 + αi + βxi,t + εi,t
However, we need a very accurate estimate byi,t to make it feasible. Excercises with
this method did not give any reasonable results, meaning that there is too much noise
in the data.
11
from ARIMAmodel in denominator scale the absolute level, thus provid-
ing a (comparable) quantification of the relative magnitude of electoral
cycle.
Hypothesis B predicts a negative sign for β. Presence of individual
constant coeﬃcients αi (i.e. variation in the magnitude of political cy-
cles) is interpreted as a result of diﬀerent density of opposition MPs and
various degree of regional councils’ capture by the “party-in-power” in
these regions, as long as we control for rationality of voters and easiness
of access to information there.
4.3 Preliminary estimation results
4.3.1 National-level data tests for electoral cycles
At first we have tested for the presence of electoral cycles in the national-
level economic outcomes and policy measures. PcGive package (Hendry
and Doornik, 2001) is used for estimation of time-series models. Ap-
pendix A presents estimation results for CPI inflation, GDP growth,
State budget’s expenditures, revenues and deficit; and appendix B de-
picts estimated cycles in these variables (all series pictured are de-trended
and seasonally adjusted).
CPI inflation demonstrates lower paces half a year before elections
as compared to the same period after elections, a dramatic downturn 1
month before elections, and rises sharply 1 month after elections. GDP
growth shows an upturn 2 months before elections and in the month of
elections, as well as 1 month afterwards. Budget expenditures demon-
strate an upturn before and a downturn after elections. Budget revenues
are decreasing in a 6 months before to 2 months before elections period,
but they rise sharply during the 3-months period around elections. On
the contrary, budget revenues including interbudgetary transfers do not
demonstrate any decreasing pattern before elections, meaning that the
central budget receives net transfers from lower-level budgets 2 months
before elections. As a result of electoral cycle, budget deficit is higher
in the period before elections, reaching its maximum 2 months before
elections. The behavior of a budget deficit including intergovernmental
transfers variable reveals that increasing transfers from local budgets to
the central budget in the period 2 months before elections are used to
balance the central budget’s expenditures and revenues.
However, all these regularities are not significant at conventional lev-
els of significance, at least partially due to a little number of observations
at hand. Hence, we can conclude that we found only weak evidence of
electoral cycles in State budget, GDP growth and inflation (i.e., electoral
cycle is observed not only in policy variables, but is also transmitted from
government policy measures to economic activity indicators).
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4.3.2 Regional-level data tests for electoral cycles
Some estimation details. The model we estimate (equation 1) has
the general form of:
yi,t = αi +
kX
j=1
βjyi,t−j + x
0
tθ + εi,t (3)
The problem with estimating such models is the violation of classical
assumption that E(²|X) = 0 due to the presence of the lagged dependent
variable. The usual way to proceed is as follows (Arellano and Bond,
1991; Greene, 2000). At first individual eﬀects αi are eliminated by
diﬀerencing the equation in levels 3:
yi,t − yi,t−1=
kX
j=1
βj(yi,t−j − yi,t−j−1) + (xt−xt−1)0θ + (εi,t − εi,t−1)
∆yi,t=
kX
j=1
βj∆yi,t−j +∆x0tθ +∆εi,t (4)
Then the lags of yi,t−1 and xt−1 are used as instrumental variables
in GMM estimator based on equation in diﬀerences 4. However, this
estimator is found to have large finite sample bias.
A system GMM estimator is believed to have a better performance
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). It combines both
equation in levels and equation in diﬀerences. The instruments for the
regression in diﬀerences are the same as described above. Lagged dif-
ferences of the corresponding variables, ∆yi,t−1 and ∆xt−1, are used as
instruments for the regression in levels.
Sargan test is used for testing for the validity of instruments, with the
null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals.
Because of the presence of MA disturbance term, first order autocorre-
lation process arises in the equation in diﬀerences. However, proposed
estimation method requires the absence of the first order autocorrela-
tion in original equation in levels (equation 3), thus the second order
autocorrelation in the transformed equation in diﬀerences (equation 4)
should be eliminated.
In our particular case, equation in levels is equation 1, and it gives
the following equation in diﬀerences:
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yi,t − yi,t−1=(αs − αs−1) +
kX
j=1
βj(yi,t−j − yi,t−j−1) +
+
mX
j=−l
γj(et+j − et+j−1) + δ(t− (t− 1)) + (εi,t − εi,t−1)
∆yi,t=∆αs +
kX
j=1
βj∆yi,t−j +
mX
j=−l
γj∆et+j + δ +∆εi,t
In our case, lags of yi,t−1 serve as instrumental variables for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 is taken as an instrumental
variable for equation in levels.
Estimation results. We use a DPD package for GiveWin (Doornik
et al., 2002) for estimation of panel data models. Appendix C presents
estimation results for fiscal policy measures from the panel of regional
budgets execution data; and appendix D depicts estimated cycles (again,
de-trended and seasonally adjusted).
Apparently, many of the spending items demonstrate a distinct elec-
toral cycle. Significant relationships are demonstrated by total bud-
get expenditues, total budget expenditues including intergovernmental
transfers, and expenditures on social protection. Thus, total expen-
ditures reach their peak 5 months before elections, and gradually fall
afterwards. Note that total expenditures including intergovernmental
transfers are higher than previous indicator during the 2-months period
right before elections, i.e. regions transfer more funds to the central bud-
get then. Expenditures on education, social protection, media, industry
and communications clearly show a patern correlated with elections date.
They are typically increasing before elections, reach their maximum near
the time of elections, and fall afterwards. Expenditures on health care
and agriculture are also rising in the period before elections, but they are
demonstrating higher volumes on the average in post-electoral months.
Most likely, some intra-budget redistribution between spending items
are happening.
Budget revenue items give a less clear-cut picture. Here, only total
budget revenues and total budget revenues including intergovernmen-
tal transfers have significant interrelation with elections. Total revenues
increase in the period before elections in order to finance higher expen-
ditures, as well as transfers to central budget. This increase is explained
in part by initially low but then rising non-tax revenues (capital income,
rents, fees, custom duties) and revenues from transactions with capital.
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However, tax revenues are falling from an initially high level during the
period before elections (and rise only afterwards).
Budget deficit is also correlated with elections date. Budget deficit
starts to boost as elections approach, and rises until the 2nd month
after elections, majority of coeﬃcients on electoral dummies are highly
significant.
Thus, we found rather convincing evidence for the presence of elec-
toral cycle in regional fiscal policy.
Budget expenditures tend to rise in pre-electoral period, and fall in
post-electoral period. As a result, more funds are spent on public goods
and large employers (education and communication sectors), direct mon-
etary transfers (social protection) and political communication and "pro-
paganda" (mass-media). However, there is also redistribution within the
budgets between diﬀerent spending items, for instance expenditures on
health care and agriculture are counter-cyclical in a sense: although
growing in the period before elections, they are higher in post-electoral
phase rather than in pre-electoral one. Budget revenues generally fol-
low the same pattern, but a certain structural change is observed: tax
revenues fall throughout the electoral period demonstrating an expan-
sionary electoral cycle, while non-tax revenues and revenues from capital
rise during the electoral period compensating for increased spending. In-
creasing deficit accounts for the remaining discrepancy between budget
expenditures and revenues in pre-electoral period.
Hence, rather than relying on intertemporal redistribution (increas-
ing spending, decreasing revenues, and running a deficit, which is liq-
uidated from savings and in subsequent periods) only, incumbent also
expands the public sector in order to gain control over higher volumes
of resources and redistribute them with an aim of increasing its electoral
chances. However, this expansion is somehow selective: tax revenues
(that directly hit the majority of voters) decrease in the period of elec-
tions, while non-tax revenues (that are less observable by the majority of
voters directly) and revenues from transactions with capital (also more
relevant to a narrower group of richer voters, e.g. capital owners, rent-
seekers, and entrepreneurs) are actually increasing. Additonally, part of
the increased expenditures is financed due to intra-budgetary redistri-
bution between spending items.
An additional interesting finding is pre-electoral increase of redistri-
bution via the central budget due to intergovernmental transfers. Per-
haps, this can be explained by the tendency towards centralization of
political decision making in the critical periods, of which electoral cam-
paign is an example.
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4.3.3 Regional-level data tests for the impact of voters’ so-
phistication/access to information
Magnitude of electoral cycles (
Pm
j=−l(bγj + bγj,i + bγj,t)et+j) is measured
by estimating equation 1 with region-specific and time-specific electoral
eﬀects (bγj,i and bγj,t). In order to measure relative magnitudes of elec-
toral cycles, we use the value of respective indicator devoid of electoral
movements (byi,t) as a scale factor. It is estimated in the following way
(using ARIMA(2,0,0)):
yi,t = α0 + αi + αs + β1yi,t−1 + β2yi,t−2 + δt+ εi,t
byi,t = bα0 + bαi + bαs + bβ1byi,t−1 + bβ2byi,t−2 + bδt
Finally, we can estimate equation 2 using share of urban population,
as well as volumes of TV and radio broadcasting as proxies for sophisti-
cation of voters and easiness of their access to information. Estimation
results are presented in appendix E (note that each equation is estimated
with and without fixed regional eﬀects).
As it can be seen from pooled refressions, share of urban population
has a significant and negative eﬀect on the magnitude of cycles in budget
revenues and deficit (in panel regressions its coeﬃcient is negative albeit
insignificant). There seem to be at most weak eﬀect of TV penetration
on the magnitude of cycles – its coeﬃcient is significant in only one
regression for budget expenditures, where it has a negative sign. Volume
of radio broadcasts seem to have a significant impact on the magnitude
of cycles in budget expenditures. However, it has a positive influence,
which contradicts theoretical predictions. One possible explanation may
be that radio not only fails to provide voters with a useful political
information, but is used in some regions (most likely, those with less
informed/sophisticated population), along with economic policy cycles,
to manipulate voters.
Perhaps, this is explained by the fact that radio does not appear to
be an eﬃcient information source, i.e. that it is more politically biased
(or vice versa, less involved in political discourse) than television.
5 Conclusions
We have found relatively strong empirical proofs for the existence of
electoral cycles in the behavior of fiscal policy instruments in Ukraine.
This is especially noticeable in total budget expenditures and revenues,
as well as deficit. Some weak evidence of a similar pattern are also ob-
served in the behavior of measures of economic activity such as CPI
inflation and GDP growth. There are some weak evidence that regions
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with more informed or sophisticated voters (as measured by the share of
urban population and volumes of TV broadcating) demonostrate lower
magnitudes of electoral cycles. The existence of fiscal PBC in Ukraine
is broadly consistent with the findings of Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
(2003) for Russia, and Hallerberg and de Souza (2000) for Eastern Eu-
ropean accession countries.
Since magnitude of electoral cycles shrinks when voters become more
informed and sophisticated, education of voters and promotion of analy-
sis and information dissemination about governmental policy, especially
on the eve of elections, will reduce the scope of distorting opportunistic
cycles. At the same time, restricting opportunistic cyclic behavior of
incumbent may not be an improvement because we can not rule out the
case that electoral cycles convey useful information about government’s
competence.
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Table 3: Estimation results
REGRESSORS CPIinfl dGDP_1_2000 le70totalt le70totaligtt
α0 0.394019 1862.93* 1.67703* 1.40135
0.5534 941.0 0.9234 0.8645
yi,t−1 0.599363*** -0.671216*** 0.339369 0.385077
0.1137 0.1453 0.2306 0.2299
yi,t−2 - -0.294898** 0.184622 0.209708
0.1418 0.2204 0.2203
yi,t−4 - -0.0942638 - -
0.1551
yi,t−5 - -0.125841 - -
0.1608
yi,t−6 0.162405 -0.171374 - -
0.1075 0.1329
et+6 -0.606113 -931.038 0.0352283 0.0225367
0.8247 1440. 0.1270 0.1253
et+5 -0.324274 541.680 0.0393695 0.0481306
0.7261 1245. 0.1117 0.1102
et+4 -0.419162 545.119 0.0522521 0.0349725
0.7275 1229. 0.1117 0.1107
et+3 -0.137982 -1905.47 0.0477046 0.0281257
0.7301 1231. 0.1125 0.1110
et+2 0.0773132 -202.766 0.0120567 -0.00247730
0.7276 1273. 0.1578 0.1569
et+1 -0.964615 603.408 0.104176 0.0476274
0.7545 1300. 0.1694 0.1683
et -0.0812608 60.8888 0.0823565 0.0628974
0.7419 1258. 0.1210 0.1178
et−1 1.11140 220.640 -0.0900002 -0.118268
0.7569 1341. 0.1225 0.1195
et−2 -0.367098 -1864.42 -0.128017 -0.0988164
0.7333 1267. 0.1209 0.1196
et−3 0.0637307 172.206 0.0820524 0.0914099
0.7289 1258. 0.1162 0.1150
et−4 0.824389 1167.78 0.0503220 0.0483854
0.7331 1251. 0.1171 0.1160
et−5 0.309770 815.663 -0.152040 -0.130877
0.7535 1241. 0.1145 0.1135
et−6 0.0951923 -1701.93 0.0669419 0.0687315
0.8185 1442. 0.1348 0.1324
# obs. 72 72 46 46
R2 0.679947 0.692409 0.874397 0.865522
AR(1) test 10.402 11.355 8.5098* 7.3628
# lags 12 12 4 4
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. t – trend is included (but not reported).
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimation results
REGRESSORS lr70totalt lr70totaligtt ldeft ldefigtt
α0 1.59240* 1.90569* 0.256308 -0.0659420
0.7890 0.9560 0.4481 0.8451
yi,t−1 0.324093 0.314920 0.471580* -0.129452
0.2213 0.2347 0.2277 0.2255
yi,t−2 0.261119 0.141985 -0.209752 0.0952223
0.1873 0.2306 0.2274 0.2593
et+6 0.0450057 -0.0147123 0.119896 -0.844829
0.1352 0.1446 0.4792 1.046
et+5 0.0898522 0.0479315 -0.139701 0.834772
0.1205 0.1265 0.4164 0.8217
et+4 -0.00401917 0.0182261 0.240303 1.48190*
0.1214 0.1271 0.4165 0.8544
et+3 -0.114473 0.0188589 0.237133 0.452894
0.1210 0.1270 0.4193 0.9022
et+2 -0.299207* -0.0115569 1.28567** -0.0876126
0.1685 0.1816 0.5999 1.173
et+1 0.0793358 -0.00430896 0.434243 0.216367
0.1966 0.1943 0.7032 1.246
et 0.155148 0.0499280 0.608993 0.576626
0.1223 0.1331 0.4860 0.8773
et−1 -0.121336 -0.0740954 -0.224359 -0.443606
0.1304 0.1367 0.4774 0.8896
et−2 -0.0112558 -0.0675185 -0.763274 -1.43829
0.1323 0.1322 0.4625 0.8342
et−3 -0.00755538 0.00780586 0.638225 0.817372
0.1221 0.1313 0.4758 0.8909
et−4 0.0468704 0.0295855 -0.799886 0.951734
0.1217 0.1312 0.4869 0.9153
et−5 -0.393302*** -0.102978 0.0618082 -0.141015
0.1232 0.1316 0.4563 0.8667
et−6 0.0690950 0.0238506 0.260350 -0.236842
0.1685 0.1503 0.4821 0.9374
# obs. 46 46 46 46
R2 0.845339 0.746856 0.858097 0.701762
AR(1) test 8.3274* 5.9726 11.503** 10.202**
# lags 4 4 4 4
Notes: Estimated by OLS. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses. t – trend is included (but not reported).
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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C Estimation results, dynamic panel data models
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Table 5: Estimation results
REGRESSORS le70total le70totaligt le7educ le8health
δ -5.75868 10.0732*** 4.76503** 8.37373***
3.781 2.288 1.850 2.381
yi,t−1 3.70367*** -1.80032*** -1.32085*** -2.09117***
1.276 0.5094 0.4856 0.5741
yi,t−2 3.18859*** -1.36126*** 0.0588577 -0.590319
1.058 0.4593 0.5474 0.3744
et+6 13.8364*** 0.526477** -0.304811 -0.293139
3.883 0.2279 0.4598 0.5591
et+5 34.2036*** 1.41786** 0.229303 -1.49396
9.648 0.5983 0.5778 1.256
et+4 31.2315*** 3.02282*** 1.02841 -2.25011
8.746 0.8798 0.6982 1.648
et+3 25.7212*** 5.45535*** 1.07495 -2.80127
7.067 1.422 1.001 1.889
et+2 10.2754*** 6.23592*** 1.18625 -2.46205
2.637 1.577 0.7499 1.688
et+1 -3.94389** 5.11199*** 0.509978 -1.70407
1.585 1.264 0.9776 1.620
et -17.2899*** 3.09532*** -0.381362 -0.128633
5.185 0.7582 1.238 1.771
et−1 -24.637*** 4.28242*** -0.442813 -0.351201
7.299 1.136 1.097 1.231
et−2 -27.9289*** 5.69211*** -1.14966 -0.632600
8.234 1.577 0.9867 1.172
et−3 -31.6977*** 6.26385*** -1.06481 -1.05205
9.306 1.763 0.7578 0.9619
et−4 -35.4296*** 4.22078*** -1.05386* -1.53520***
10.23 1.255 0.5936 0.5606
et−5 -31.0793*** 2.63810*** -0.385222 -1.40118***
8.885 0.8534 0.3908 0.4130
et−6 -17.8524*** 1.12819*** -0.247299 -0.297517*
5.125 0.3845 0.3412 0.1651
# obs. 1242 1242 1242 1242
Wald (joint) 68.30*** 63.42*** 51.73*** 37.01***
Wald (dummy) 400.0*** 547.1*** 533.9*** 302.5***
Sargan test, 6.849e-012 -8.007e-014 -7.626e-016 7.104e-015
df 1111 1111 1111 1111
AR(1) test 2.890*** 2.731*** 0.04472 1.692*
AR(2) test 2.979*** 1.604 -2.076** -2.324**
Notes: System GMM estimator uses as instruments lags of yi,t−1 for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 for equation in levels. Second step
estimation results are presented. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimation results
REGRESSORS le9socialpr le12media le14industry le16agric
δ 13.6387** -10.1252 -1.33832 -6.37881
5.342 8.797 5.341 20.77
yi,t−1 -2.52102*** 0.426459 0.382735 -0.675896
0.8479 0.9531 1.238 2.488
yi,t−2 -0.320627 -1.64533 -0.141974 -1.45267
0.2438 2.336 0.8279 2.181
et+6 2.55275** 0.926592 -6.80382 -2.62260
0.9991 1.159 8.210 3.194
et+5 1.69917 1.86039 14.1235 -5.79838
1.261 2.797 29.47 4.021
et+4 4.97365** 3.05169 75.7819 -9.50936
2.123 3.514 84.33 17.65
et+3 11.7709*** 2.80699 108.943 -8.55370
4.043 4.017 117.5 11.20
et+2 15.7357*** 4.76893 119.487 -1.94475
5.766 7.512 120.1 18.38
et+1 15.4655*** 6.66324 64.6425 1.66836
5.361 10.11 63.40 43.93
et 1.01871 7.75285 5.70401 3.16009
2.851 10.52 20.64 47.09
et−1 -6.26087 9.49327 -11.4072 9.72731
3.824 9.871 14.84 67.38
et−2 -9.63836* 7.74587 -22.2622 14.1049
5.484 8.123 18.03 86.74
et−3 -8.40054* 6.12726 11.6018 15.2284
5.060 6.441 26.78 86.73
et−4 -4.17634 3.40800 35.5861 9.30930
3.741 4.399 41.97 51.22
et−5 -1.37785 1.96956 48.5328 5.57190
2.780 3.635 49.51 30.24
et−6 -1.57361 1.14885 29.0320 1.05215
1.749 1.695 25.75 9.435
# obs. 1242 1242 1170 1242
Wald (joint) 43.47*** 21.35 11.58 24.83*
Wald (dummy) 81.79*** 127.4*** 11.02 20.13*
Sargan test, -3.591e-014 -4.316e-015 1.168e-013 -3.797e-015
df 1111 1111 1111 1111
AR(1) test 1.974** -0.7106 1.024 0.2496
AR(2) test 1.624 0.6481 0.9907 0.2210
Notes: System GMM estimator uses as instruments lags of yi,t−1 for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 for equation in levels. Second step
estimation results are presented. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 7: Estimation results
REGRESSORS le17communic lr70total lr70totaligt lr10tax
δ -3.48636 -20.9092* -9.38004 2.20332
6.235 11.48 7.196 5.832
yi,t−1 -0.368995 0.0519669 -6.34061*** -0.619299
0.5025 0.4322 2.069 0.9277
yi,t−2 -0.310303 -2.68710** 4.77371** 0.897410
0.7397 1.175 2.210 1.530
et+6 -0.0342014 2.85371** 3.49938*** 0.860249***
0.7694 1.181 1.346 0.2581
et+5 4.41983 17.7448** 14.7486** 0.987577***
8.413 7.695 5.892 0.2444
et+4 7.41918 37.6832** 14.9819** 1.18778***
13.29 16.51 5.859 0.2953
et+3 9.41547 57.3875** 19.6567*** 0.474377
15.63 25.23 7.418 1.137
et+2 4.64329 63.7338** 20.7841*** -0.432876
8.244 28.12 7.957 1.572
et+1 -0.115400 65.8800** 18.8654** -0.112892
1.820 28.97 7.508 0.9183
et -0.351573 56.0999** 37.6048** 0.647491
8.063 24.54 15.27 0.5649
et−1 -1.60276 49.0893** 48.7854** 0.129835
5.719 21.44 19.11 1.419
et−2 1.64369 55.3436** 38.7040*** 0.0769365
7.464 24.22 14.65 1.606
et−3 2.14164 55.3361** 33.0614*** 0.0378376
10.03 24.15 12.10 1.878
et−4 2.91581 45.4590** 20.3794*** -0.348233
11.57 19.87 6.901 2.204
et−5 1.20470 27.5252** 17.9170*** -2.55151
10.79 12.44 6.234 3.093
et−6 -0.0468471 13.1577** 4.24588*** -1.59627
6.191 6.202 1.267 0.9941
# obs. 1242 1242 1242 1242
Wald (joint) 18.37 97.98*** 43.47*** 76.46***
Wald (dummy) 14.91 877.0*** 332.8*** 465.5***
Sargan test, 9.212e-015 -5.979e-012 2.100e-012 8.156e-015
df 1111 1111 1111 1111
AR(1) test 0.7675 2.099** 5.202*** -0.3926
AR(2) test 1.080 2.079** 1.817* -2.138**
Notes: System GMM estimator uses as instruments lags of yi,t−1 for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 for equation in levels. Second step
estimation results are presented. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 8: Estimation results
REGRESSORS lr20nontax lr30capital lr50funds ldef
δ -0.0577239 -23.6678 5.57971 -65.5530**
4.654 33.49 16.36 31.46
yi,t−1 -0.791880 -1.08902 -1.75670 6.20548*
2.928 1.409 2.041 3.278
yi,t−2 -0.484286 -1.81510 -0.803569 7.67123**
2.677 1.439 1.519 3.759
et+6 -0.895277 1.64588 -3.65584 10.6739**
1.286 10.39 7.923 4.544
et+5 -1.11079 10.7466 -6.26833 0.922499
2.602 15.26 13.96 3.167
et+4 -1.22065 19.9760 -4.09279 -3.02739
3.632 34.81 9.193 4.699
et+3 -0.749172 22.6323 -1.55595 -8.75209
3.888 45.96 5.688 6.161
et+2 0.0671312 34.9159 -0.522003 3.72107
10.87 40.24 15.05 4.587
et+1 0.752558 20.9700 -6.32792 47.3365**
13.94 31.76 47.19 21.15
et 0.844735 35.0014 -5.45859 65.7329**
11.58 52.64 58.80 29.21
et−1 1.76394 31.6709 -6.32614 95.1414**
12.72 76.96 59.36 42.17
et−2 1.76833 44.2577 -12.2378 108.325**
11.78 114.8 65.18 48.69
et−3 0.989251 45.8136 -11.3642 108.391**
9.218 110.9 39.91 49.27
et−4 2.00077 26.3252 -8.24597 92.8721**
8.053 72.44 18.06 42.63
et−5 2.20657 20.8028 -3.73312 58.7175**
3.720 42.71 6.235 26.52
et−6 1.57691 2.32373 -3.02992 21.3794**
2.714 11.13 4.248 9.534
# obs. 1242 1042 1242 1242
Wald (joint) 24.00* 13.91 9.021 18.71
Wald (dummy) 38.60*** 12.10 10.34 29.29***
Sargan test, 1.978e-015 -3.489e-016 2.610e-015 3.895e-014
df 1111 929 1111 1111
AR(1) test 0.2148 0.1929 1.182 2.103**
AR(2) test 0.07146 0.4158 0.001393 .NaN
Notes: System GMM estimator uses as instruments lags of yi,t−1 for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 for equation in levels. Second step
estimation results are presented. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 9: Estimation results
REGRESSORS ldefigt
δ -49.1962
233.4
yi,t−1 -0.970884
3.561
yi,t−2 -2.59282
7.601
et+6 43.7036
256.8
et+5 28.6977
175.5
et+4 3.14254
41.58
et+3 24.8110
123.2
et+2 77.1784
375.4
et+1 125.686
644.6
et 69.8823
356.3
et−1 -50.5548
261.3
et−2 -29.6396
154.4
et−3 10.6122
96.02
et−4 107.403
483.1
et−5 71.8033
336.3
et−6 44.2900
213.9
# obs. 1242
Wald (joint) 16.48
Wald (dummy) 3.966
Sargan test, 3.260e-014
df 1111
AR(1) test -0.1707
AR(2) test -0.2129
Notes: System GMM estimator uses as instruments lags of yi,t−1 for equation
in diﬀerences, and lagged diﬀerence ∆yi,t−1 for equation in levels. Second step
estimation results are presented. Monthly dummies are included but not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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D Estimated cycles, dynamic panel data models
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Table 10: Estimation results
REGRESSORS magcyc_le70i magcyc_lr70i magcyc_ldefi
α0 1.05348 0.104097 8.73207
1.234 0.2704 14.44
1999 dummy 0.144169*** 0.0260855*** 0.123100**
0.003176 0.001113 0.04876
shareurban -1.72458 -0.210883 -13.9879
1.968 0.4317 23.05
R2 0.9879302 0.9644911 0.5757072
magcyc_le70 magcyc_lr70 magcyc_ldef
α0 -0.0257941*** -0.0265733*** 0.170110*
0.005876 0.001435 0.08851
1999 dummy 0.143206*** 0.0259703*** 0.115466***
0.003101 0.0009723 0.03803
shareurban 0.00679613 -0.00390432* -0.270681*
0.009034 0.002094 0.1439
R2 -0.0257941 0.9438089 0.2314986
Notes: Number of observations is 54 for each equation. Estimated
by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.
i – individual fixed eﬀects are included (but not reported).
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence
level, respectively.
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Table 11: Estimation results
REGRESSORS magcyc_le70i magcyc_lr70i magcyc_ldefi
α0 -0.00590338 -0.0283808*** 0.0342211
0.008357 0.003645 0.06423
1999 dummy 0.145926*** 0.0259343*** 0.124225**
0.003615 0.001211 0.04599
tv -0.00267719** 3.32969e-005 -0.00877934
0.001107 0.0004637 0.009623
R2 0.9891774 0.9643854 0.5755494
magcyc_le70 magcyc_lr70 magcyc_ldef
α0 -0.0218739*** -0.0289877*** 0.0167176
0.002282 0.0006725 0.02267
1999 dummy 0.143153*** 0.0259761*** 0.117971***
0.003204 0.001019 0.04062
tv 5.55121e-005 -7.87296e-006 -0.00261676
0.0003092 8.258e-005 0.003331
R2 0.9750534 0.9415697 0.1548121
Notes: Number of observations is 54 for each equation. Estimated
by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.
i – individual fixed eﬀects are included (but not reported).
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence
level, respectively.
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Table 12: Estimation results
REGRESSORS magcyc_le70i magcyc_lr70i magcyc_ldefi
α0 -0.0329014*** -0.0300299*** -0.0242381
0.001297 0.0008775 0.01508
1999 dummy 0.140230*** 0.0248677*** 0.122780**
0.003298 0.0009561 0.04550
radio 0.000874287*** 0.000322931** -0.00219085
0.0002035 0.0001250 0.003057
R2 0.9893794 0.9712114 0.5742863
magcyc_le70 magcyc_lr70 magcyc_ldef
α0 -0.0228533*** -0.0289379*** 0.00669324
0.0006381 0.0005862 0.006691
1999 dummy 0.142660*** 0.0260099*** 0.118425***
0.003119 0.0009922 0.04001
radio 0.000161335*** -1.22680e-005 -0.000912659
4.260e-005 9.735e-006 0.0007606
R2 0.976145 0.9417481 0.1545229
Notes: Number of observations is 54 for each equation. Estimated
by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses.
i – individual fixed eﬀects are included (but not reported).
*, **, *** – significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence
level, respectively.
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Table 13: Description of budgetary variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
le7educ Education
le8health Health care
le9socialpr Social protection and social care
le12media Mass media
le14industry Industry and power
le16agric Agriculture, forestry, fishery and hunting
le17communic Transportation, roads, communications, and IT
le70total Total Expenditures (excluding spending on
intergovernmental transfers)
le70totaligt Total Expenditures (including spending on
intergovernmental transfers)
lr10tax Tax revenues
lr20nontax Non-tax revenues
lr30capital Revenues from transactions with capital
lr50funds State Targeted Funds
lr70total Total Revenues (excluding receipts
from intergovernmental transfers)
lr70totaligt Total Revenues (including receipts
from intergovernmental transfers)
ldef Budget deficit
ldefigt Budget deficit (including
intergovernmental transfers)
Note: All budgetary variables are measured in January 2000 prices,
in per capita terms, and logarithms are taken.
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Table 14: Description of other variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
CPIinfl CPI inflation
dGDP_1_2000 Diﬀerence of real GDP (in January 2000 prices)
elect Elections dummy, equals 1 in the month of elections
electminus6 Elections dummy, equals 1 in 6 months before elections
shareurban Share of urban population in the region
tv Daily local TV broadcasts by state companies,
hours (previous year)
radio Daily local radio broadcasts by state companies,
hours (previous year)
magcyc_le70 Estimated magnitude of electoral cycle in total expenditures
magcyc_lr70 Estimated magnitude of electoral cycle in total revenues
magcyc_ldef Estimated magnitude of electoral cycle in deficit
Table 15: Descriptive statistics for panel budgetary variables
VARIABLE TIME SER. CR. SEC. # OBS. MAX MEAN MIN ST. D.
le7educ 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.5047 1.9112 0.0000 0.3935
le8health 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 4.5863 1.8141 -0.6351 0.3859
le9socialpr 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.5324 1.2742 -3.9046 0.7082
le12media 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 0.3381 -2.7229 -6.5552 0.8884
le14industry 1998:1-2001:12 27 1260 3.1078 -0.9268 -9.8630 1.8488
le16agric 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.1071 -1.6249 -8.9077 1.5765
le17communic 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.6351 0.4517 -5.6876 0.9122
le70total 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 5.0744 3.2769 2.0858 0.3849
le70totaligt 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 5.0823 3.2986 2.0858 0.4213
lr10tax 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 5.0660 2.7255 -1.5304 0.6528
lr20nontax 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 2.9996 0.2712 -4.8175 0.8023
lr30capital 1998:1-2001:12 27 1142 1.8529 -2.3025 -10.6118 2.5139
lr50funds 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.6173 -0.2127 -6.6099 1.3801
lr70total 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 5.0723 2.9179 -0.9391 0.6092
lr70totaligt 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 5.0812 3.3025 1.9030 0.4062
ldef 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 4.5586 1.4676 -4.6284 1.2441
ldefigt 1998:1-2001:12 27 1296 3.7559 0.0868 -5.8133 0.9952
36
Table 16: Descriptive statistics for other variables
VARIABLE TIME SER. CR. SEC. # OBS. MAX MEAN MIN ST. D.
CPIinfl 1997:1-2002:12 1 72 6.2000 1.0403 -1.8000 1.4513
dGDP_1_2000 1997:1-2002:12 1 72 7435.1 24.099 -10589 2407.3
le70total 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 4.1565 3.3583 2.8606 0.22774
le70totaligt 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 4.1702 3.4200 2.9172 0.21875
lr70total 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 3.7813 3.1966 2.3516 0.21924
lr70totaligt 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 4.1399 3.4276 3.0613 0.18480
ldef 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 3.1881 1.2632 -0.14540 0.82149
ldefigt 1998:1-2001:12 1 48 2.0004 -0.23868 -3.6563 1.0737
shareurban 1998-2002 27 135 1.0000 0.6316 0.3706 0.1638
tv 1998-2002 27 108 25.3000 7.8037 0.0000 5.3340
radio 1998-2002 27 108 94.5000 11.3991 1.3000 16.4748
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